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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS, LOCAL UNION 222 
and LOCAL UNION 976, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, \ Case No. 
13679 
vs. 
MOTOR CARGO, a corporation, 
Defendcmt-A ppellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Respondents to obtain an 
Order of the Court requiring the parties to the action 
to arbitrate a grievance arising out of a collective bar-
gaining labor agreement which provides that such griev-
ance be arbitrated. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE 
I N T R I A L COURT 
The Trial Court found that a grievance had arisen 
between the parties to the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, that the Agreement provided that such grievances 
be arbitrated when timely requested, that a timely 
request was made of the employer defendant by the 
unions. The Court then ordered the grievance to be 
arbitrated by Joseph C. Fratto, and retained jurisdic-
tion of the matter in the event any problems arose as 
to the selection of the Arbitrator or as to the issues to 
be arbitrated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
a direction from this Court that an arbitrable dispute 
does not exist between the parties. 
Respondents seek to have this court affirm the deci-
sion of the Trial Court in all respects. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
W e agree with the facts as stated by Appellant 
and add the following: 
1. The Union steward, Robinson, did not know 
what the new Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan provided, 
was not given a written copy of it by the Company, 
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and did not obtain a copy thereof until after he called 
the Union's business agent, Neldin Stephenson, on the 
phone on September 17, 1973. At that time he told Mr. 
Stephenson that he did not have a copy of the Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield Plan, and Mr. Stephenson asked 
Robinson if he could get him a copy. H e thereafter 
located a copy and gave it to Mr. Stephenson within 
a day or two (R 51). 
Mr. Stephenson then studied the Plan and com-
pared it with the old company plan (R 51-52), and 
as a result thereof the union met with the company 
officials on September 24, 1973 (R 53) pursuant to 
the Unions' claim that the new Plan constituted a 
grievance that should be arbitrated (R 53-54), which 
the Company refused (R 54). The Union thereafter 
sent a letter to the defendant on October 9, 1973 
(R 54) which appears in the Record as Exhibit " B " 
attached to plaintiffs' Complaint. This letter shows 
the Unions' analysis of the additional benefits of the 
new Barton (Motor Cargo) Plan over its old plan, 
and the Union therein requested that the matter be 
submitted to arbitration on the issue as to whether the 
new Plan of the Company was betten than, or only 
the equivalent of, the old Plan. 
2. At the trial it was agreed by the Court and 
the parties that the only issue which the Court needed 
to decide was whether the union had given timely 
notice of its grievance to the employer as a pre-
requisite of arbitration (R 48-49). 
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3. The only difference between plaintiffs' Com-
plaint and the Amended Complaint is the added alle-
gations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
Amended Complaint having to do with application 
of federal law to the issues of the case. Otherwise, the 
Amended Complaint is no different from the 
Complaint. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E R E C O R D E S T A B L I S H E S A P P E L -
LANT'S CONTRACTUAL O B L I G A T I O N TO 
A R B I T R A T E . 
Appellant argues that because Respondents 
failed to attach another copy of the Labor Agreement 
to the Amended Complaint — the same as had been 
attached to the Complaint — there was, therefore, no 
Agreement before the Court to consider; that it 
wasn't in evidence, and, therefore, there was no agree-
ment to support an Order to arbitrate. 
Our answer to this is: 
1. In its Answer Appellant admits it entered 
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement and affirma-
tively alleged that the Agreement speaks for itself. 
This language necessarily refers to and adopts as 
part of its Answer the only Agreement on file, namely, 
the Agreement attached to the Complaint. 
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2. At no time during the Order to Show Cause 
Hearing or during the trial did Appellant object to 
the use of the Agreement filed with the Complaint as 
the appropriate document under consideration; and if 
there were ever any merit to appellant's argument, it 
surely waived any right to protest the use of that docu-
ment at the trial. 
3. The appellant freely acknowledged at the trial 
that the only issue to be determined was the 30-day 
notice clause in the Agreement which was attached 
to the Complaint and which it freely used in its pres-
entation before the Court. (R 48). 
4. There is no difference between the allegations 
of the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, except 
for additional allegations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
Amended Complaint concerning facts inducing the 
application of federal law; and the failure of plain-
tiffs to attach the same Agreement to the Amended 
Complaint which it had attached to the Complaint does 
not appear to be the type of thing included in the 
principles discussed by AmJur 2d as quoted by Appel-
lant at pp.6 and 7 of its Brief. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E RECORD R E V E A L S T H A T T H E 
P A R T I E S D R O P P E D A N Y A N D A L L IS-
SUES F O R T H E COURT TO D E C I D E E X -
C E P T T H E I S S U E AS TO W H E T H E R 
5 
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T I M E L Y N O T I C E AS R E Q U I R E D BY T H E 
A G R E E M E N T WAS G I V E N BY P L A I N -
T I F F S TO D E F E N D A N T . 
Respondents readily concede that there was no 
evidence presented at the trial except as to the matter 
of notice by the Union to the Company that there was 
a grievance based on alleged changed benefits in the 
health and welfare plan, and that the notice was given 
within the 30-day period required by the Agreement. 
On pp. 48 and 49 of the Record the Court said that 
the timely notice issue was the only issue it was con-
cerned with, and that if there were other issues, the 
hearing would have to be postponed to another day. The 
parties agreed to proceed and have the matter deter-
mined on this issue alone. At the conclusion of the trial 
of this issue, the Court said it would take the matter 
under advisement and let the parties know in due time 
of its decision. No objection by either party was made 
to these proceedings (R 72). 
We, therefore, submit that except for the issue 
of timely notice, all issues were waived, and that the 
effect of such was that if the Court held that timely 
notice had been given, then the matter would be arbi-
trated and that if timely notice had not been given, 
there would be no arbitration. 
We further submit that the contract does provide 
for an airing of all appropriate issues before an arbi-
trator rather than before the courts. The law as to this 
matter begins with a statement of policy in the Labor 
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Management Relations Act of 1947 at Section 203, 
which reads: 
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by 
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable 
method for settlement of grievance disputes aris-
ing over the application or interpretation of an 
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement". 
In 1960 the U. S. Supreme Court decided three 
cases usually referred to as the Trilogy which dealt with 
problems of arbitration of grievances as provided for 
in collective bargaining agreements. These cases are 
United Steel Workers of America vs. American Manu-
facturing Company, 80 S.Ct 1343; United Steel Work-
ers of America vs. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Com-
pany, 80 S.Ct 1347; and United Steel Workers of 
America vs. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 80 S.Ct 
1358. In summary these cases held that where arbitra-
tion is provided for in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the courts may determine whether an issue is arbi-
trable unless the parties expressly provide that the arbi-
trator is to determine arbitrability. These cases empha-
size that the courts must compel arbitration where a 
claim by one of the parties appears to be governed by 
the contract, even though the court might feel that the 
grievance is baseless, and that doubts of arbitrability 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration unless it could 
be said with " positive assurance" that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers 
the dispute. These cases also hold that the question of 
interpretation of the agreement is for the arbitrator, and 
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that courts "have no business overruling him because 
their interpretation of the contract is different from 
his"; that courts should not delve into the merits of 
grievances. 
Quoting directly from Steel Workers vs. Warrior 
and Ghdf Navigation Company, 80 S.Ct 1347, the 
Court says: 
"The Collective Bargaining Agreement states 
the rights and duties of the parties. I t is more 
than a contract. I t is a generalized code to gov-
ern a myriad of cases which the draftsman can-
not wholly anticipate. The Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement covers the whole employment 
relationship. I t calls into being a new common 
law-—the common law of a particular industry 
or of a particular plant. * * * * 
"Arbitration is the means of solving the unfore-
seeable by molding a system of private law for 
all the problems which may arise and to provide 
for their solution in a way which will generally 
accord with the variant needs and desires of the 
parties. The processing of disputes through the 
grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by 
which meaning and content is given to the Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement. * * * * 
"An order to arbitrate the particular grievance 
should not be denied unless it may be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is 
not susceptible to an interpretation that covers 
the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved 
in favor of coverage". 
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P O I N T I I I 
R E S P O N D E N T S T I M E L Y R E Q U E S T E D 
A R B I T R A T I O N P U R S U A N T TO T H E R E -
Q U I R E M E N T S O F T H E A G R E E M E N T . 
This is the issue which the Trial Court considered 
and upon which it ruled. The facts are not in dispute. 
The only issue here is when does the 30-day period 
begin. Does it begin when the union steward, Mr. 
Robinson, learned that the Company was "enrolling 
the people for the new contract which was approxi-
mately July 25" (R 16) ? At that time Mr. Robinson 
was informed by Mr. Peterson, the Company's claim 
manager, "that our old insurance carrier, Home Life, 
had raised our premiums without any change in bene-
fits back in June to be effective August 1, and so I 
explained to them that we had gone out and done some 
shopping to try to find a better program for, you know, 
less, which we did. We were going to have to pay it 
anyway" (R 17-18). 
If it can be said that the steward was a repre-
sentative of the union for notification purposes (and 
we, in fact, deny it) of what really was he notified? 
The above quote is all that the Company produced as 
evidence that the union was advised of the kind of an 
increase in benefiits above an "equivalent" change. Mr. 
Robinson was really given only an oral statement that 
the company was shopping around for increased bene-
fits for the same amount of maney to which Home Life 
had increased their premiums for the same old plan. 
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He was not told they had found a better plan. H e was 
not given a written plan that the union could study to 
see if a change had been made that qualified as an 
increase over "equivalent" benefits. Several changes 
could have been made, which, when analyzed, could 
well prove to be a change without any real increased 
benefits. I t was a matter for study by the proper union 
officials after a reasonable notice of all appropriate facts 
had been given them. W e do not believe a casual con-
versation with the union steward by the claims manager 
about shopping around for a better plan meets the 
requirements of notice to the Union that the Company 
had increased benefits above an equivalent amount over 
the old plan. Nor did the Court believe it. 
What the Court did reasonably find was, that when 
the steward on September 17 called a business agent of 
Local 222 and told him "that it was his understanding 
that the new health and welfare plan that the company 
had set up with Blue Cross-Blue Shield was a better 
plan than the old health and welfare plan that they 
had with Home Life" a constructive notice of a griev-
ance may have begun to develop. At that time there 
was nothing in the Record to show that the steward 
knew anything about the plan prior to the call, or that 
it hadn't just occurred to him that there may be an 
increase in benefits which should be investigated, and 
that he therefore forthwith proceeded to call the union. 
The Union's business agent, Mr. Stephenson, whom 
the steward called, asked the steward if he had a copy 
of the new plan. H e didn't. Stephenson then asked 
10 
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the steward to get him a copy, and within a day or two 
he did ( R 8 ) . We submit that there was no constructive 
notice to the Union until it got a copy of the plan and 
studied it. Not until the Union officials could study it 
and see if the new Company plan benefits were an 
increase over equivalent benefits of the Company's old 
plan was the Union put on notice constructively that it 
had a grievance on its hands. In effect this is the way 
the Court ruled, holding that within 30 days of that 
time, namely a day or two after September 17, 1973, 
the union notified the employer in writing (on October 
9,1973, see letter attached to Complaint) of a grievance 
which it wanted arbitrated according to the Agreement 
inasmuch as the matter had not been resolved in the 
meeting between the parties which the union had called 
and held with Respondent prior thereto. 
If the company can change the plan on August 1, 
1973, and the 30-day period begins to run on August 1, 
without the Company giving the Union any formal, 
informal, written or oral notice of the essential facts, 
and without the union being made aware of it from 
any source, then the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
But if the time does not begin to run until the 
union becomes aware of the grievance (which did not 
occur until after September 17, 1973) then the Trial 
Court's ruling should be affirmed. The Trial Court 
held that until the union is aware of a grievance there 
is, in effect, no grievance upon which it can give notice 
11 
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to the company to arbitrate. Justice, equity, and a 
reasonable interpretation of the contract require, we 
believe, affirmance of the Trial Court's judgment, and 
the grievance should be arbitrated as ordered by the 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the judg-
ment of the lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. P A R K SMOOT 
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